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The Flexibility of the Workweek in the United States: 
Evidence from the FIFA World Cup
*
 
In this paper I explore the flexibility of the work week in the United States, using the FIFA 
Soccer World Cup as a natural experiment. My empirical strategy exploits the exogenous 
variation that arises due to which country hosts the World Cup, as this will determine the time 
games are broadcast across different time zones in the United States. The hour of the day 
when games are broadcast differentially affects hours of work across different time zones. 
Further, the calendar timing of the World Cup allows me to compare labor market outcomes 
in June/July for a worker in World Cup year t, with the outcomes in June/July for a worker in 
non-World Cup years t + 1, t + 2 and t + 3. My results highlight the importance of the worker's 
pay frequency in their work week flexibility, as all differences in hours of work due to the 
World Cup are concentrated among salary paid workers, while hourly paid workers do not 
change their market hours during the World Cup. Also, my results show that after controlling 
for observable demographic characteristics as well as year and month fixed effects, a worker 
reduces on average his weekly number of hours of work during the World Cup by statistically 
significant estimates that range from 9 weekly minutes to 28 weekly minutes, depending on 
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At any given time, workers should benet from some exibility in their work schedule.
There are events whose timing overlap with the workday and rescheduling work, or
abstaining from work, to consume a given event may result in higher workers' utility.
Perhaps workers know ahead of time when this event will occur and plan accordingly:
for example during the NCAA tournaments in March, Saint Patrick's Day also in
March, or the Presidential Inauguration in January. Similarly, workers will equally
benet from some work exibility in the face of an event that is unpredictable, such
as: bad weather, a natural disaster, or a sick child at home. Even though schedule
exibility is important and valued by workers, we know very little about its prevalence
in the United States.
While workers' schedule exibility has remained relatively unexplored, economists
have paid considerable attention to the market hours of American workers. For ex-
ample, Costa (2000) analyzes the evolution of the workday length of the average
American male between 1890 and 1991, Coleman and Pencavel (1993a, 1993b) an-
alyze the evolution of hours worked by American workers between 1940-1988, and
Kuhn and Lozano (2008) analyze the evolution of the length of the workweek of
American workers between 1979 and 2006. Similarly, economists have been inter-
ested in understanding the tradeo between leisure and paid labor. Recent research
includes Connolly (2008) who shows that weather determines a workers allocation of
market hours, as workers work longer hours during rainy days than on sunny days, or
Gonzalez-Chapela (2007) who show that as prices of recreation goods (complements
of leisure) increase, American workers' hours of work increase as well. A natural
2extension to ask is whether workers would decrease their hours of labor in the face
of an event that overlaps with the workday. If workers value such an event enough,
then it is conceivable that they would choose to consume the event rather than do
paid market work when the event is occurring.
In this paper, I use the exogenous variation that arises due to the FIFA soccer
World Cup to explore the schedule exibility of American workers during the last 15
years, . That is, unlike events that cater to the American public and may be scheduled
at times where Americans reduce their work hours anyway, the World Cup's games
schedule and host country choice is determined mostly independently form the U.S.
labor market or the preferences of American workers. Further, as each World Cup
is hosted by a dierent country and played every four years, the time games are
broadcast live in America may or may not overlap with the workday depending on
the host country where the World Cup is played. This allows me to estimate the
causal eect that the World Cup has on changes in a worker's schedule exibility
from three independent sources of variation: across time   comparing year t with
year t + i;i = 1;2;3; across space   the host country will determine the time games
are broadcast live in the U.S.; lastly, the third source of variation is the time games
are broadcast live in each U.S. time zone, as each match broadcast's scheduled time
will dier across dierent time zones   potentially the same game will overlap with
the workday in a time zone within the U.S. and not in other time zones.
Empirically, I compare deviations in a worker's weekly work hours during the World
Cup from his usual work schedule, with the deviations from the usual workweek of a
demographically equivalent worker at other times. Importantly, and as argued above,
games played in dierent countries are televised live at dierent local times, and the
3times that these games are televised locally will determine whether the timing of
the World Cup overlaps with the workers regular work schedule in each U.S. time
zone. For example, in France 1998 most of the games were played at 9:00 pm Central
European Time; which is 4:00 pm on the U.S. East Coast and 1:00 pm on the Pacic
Coast. In contrast, in Korea-Japan 2002 most of the games took place at 8:30 pm
Eastern Asia time, this is 7:30 am on the East Coast and 4:30 am on the West Coast.
I hypothesize that as the World Cup is played in dierent host countries, the worker's
decision to supply less market hours than in a usual work week varies accordingly to
the time games are televised in the local time zone: when the games are televised
early in the morning or late in the afternoon, Americans will not reduce their hours
of work as much as when games are televised between 9:00 am and 5:00 pm locally.
In a sense, my strategy is similar to Hamermesh et al (2008) who analyze the timing
and coordination between persons' activities and local television schedules.
My results show that after controlling for observable demographic characteristics,
as well as year and monthly xed eects, American workers reduce their weekly hours
of work on average during the World Cup by up to 9 minutes or roughly one out of
every ten workers reduces his weekly hours by the time it takes to watch a complete
soccer match (90 minutes plus fteen minutes half time intermission) per week. Most
of this change is concentrated among salary paid workers, who reduce their hours
of work by 28 weekly minutes on average. Again, this is equivalent to one in three
salary paid workers adjusting his hours of work by the time it takes to watch a game,
or more likely 1 in 9 salary paid workers adjusts his hours of work by the amount of
time it takes to watch three weekly soccer matches. Interestingly, after controlling
for demographic characteristics, year and month xed eects, hourly paid workers
4do not adjust their hours of work during the soccer World Cup. This dierence is
signicant because the short run opportunity cost of one hour worked less among
salary paid workers is arguably zero or very small, while for hourly paid workers the
short run opportunity cost of one hour less of work is the forgone hourly wage. To the
extent that salary paid workers are associated with white collar jobs, and hourly paid
workers are associated with blue collar jobs (Hamermesh, 2002), this result highlights
an important source in labor market dierences among workers in the United States
with dierent pay frequency.
2 Data
In this paper I use data from the 1994-2007 NBER Collection of the Current Popula-
tion Survey Outgoing Rotations Groups (CPS OGR). In order to identify variations
in hours of work between households that are surveyed during the World Cup and
not, I estimate the dierence between the respondent's hours worked last week and
his usual hours of work, and I multiply this dierence by 60 for ease of interpreta-
tion1. These two measures are consistent as they refer to the hours of work in the
respondent's main job, and the only dierence is that usual hours refers to the mode
of all workweeks, and last week refers to the hours in the week prior to the CPS survey
week, the reference week. 2. A negative dierence between last week hours and usual
1Multiplying by 60 allows the results to be interpreted in minutes, instead than in fraction of an hour.
2The question for usual hours is HRUSL1: How many hours per week (do/does) (name/you) USUALLY work at
(your/his/her) (job?/main job? By main job we mean) (the one at which (you/he/she) usually) ((work/works)
the most hours.) and the question for hours last week is HRACT1: ((LAST WEEK/THE WEEK BEFORE
LAST)/So, for (LAST WEEK/THE WEEK BEFORE LAST)), how many hours did (you/he/she) ACTUALLY work
at (your/his/her) (job?/MAIN job?). One dierence between these two questions in that the universe for usual hours
all employed people (lfsr94=1 or lfsr94=2) while for hours last week is only employed currently at work (lfsr94=1).
For respondents whose labor force status is employed, not at work (lfsr=2) the hours last week response is missing
as they work zero hours last week and are out of the question's universe. The reason why these workers were absent
from work last week are (proportion): vacation (53%); illness (25%); child care problems, family or personal problems,
5hours means that the hours of work last week were less than the hours in the usual
week { a positive dierence means that hours in the usual week are less than hours
last week. The null hypothesis to test is whether the dierence between usual and
last week hours is zero, and during the World Cup I expect these dierence in hours
of work to be negative. Hereafter, I will refer to this dierence as the weekly work-
ing gap. Importantly, I concentrate on the worker's exibility to change hours across
weeks, and am unable to identify exibility within weeks or days. Omitting the latter
attenuates my results towards zero, as I am failing to capture another dimension of
schedule exibility. Further, I am unable to make any statement about changes in
total hours worked over the long run due to the World Cup, or any change in the
worker's productivity.
Figure I and Figure II show the weekly working gap for 48 periods of time be-
tween 1994 and 2007 . Figure I refers to salary paid workers, and Figure II refers
to hourly paid workers. Each time period is composed as follows: Period 1 contains
observations surveyed during February(t), March(t) and April(t); Period 2 contains
observations surveyed during May(t), June (t) and July(t); Period 3 contains obser-
vations from the August(t), September(t), and October(t) surveys; and Period 4 from
the November(t), December(t) and January(t+1) surveys 3 Periods when the World
Cup is being played are highlighted in red and a dashed line marks all summers. The
data in these gures highlight three facts: First, dierences in hours of work between
last weeks hours and a usual weeks hours tend to be negative, this is not surprising as
workers tend to take days o, holidays, sick leave and vacation. Figure 1 also shows
paternity/maternity leave (12%); all other (10%). As these workers worked zero hours last week, I change the value
of hours last week accordingly.
3In these gures I collapse the data into periods of three months just to facilitate the visual representation of the
data, in the rest of the paper each period of time is one calandar month.
6that American workers do tend to work less hours last week on average during the
World Cup than at other periods, but these dierences do not seem much greater than
dierences in other June/July periods. Finally, these data show that the variance in
dierences between last week and usual hours is greater among salaried paid workers
than among hourly paid workers which is not surprising given that salaried paid
workers have more discretion over their hours of work in the short run than hourly
paid workers do (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005).
The sample in this paper includes all employed males and females living in the
United States surveyed in the CPS between 1994 and 2007, notice that the sample
includes both foreign and native born workers. During this time four World Cups were
played: USA 1994, France 1998, Korea-Japan 2002 and Germany 2006 4. I restrict
teachers and professors from the sample, as they are likely to change their working
routine during the summers. I also drop from the sample agricultural workers. To
control for outliers, I drop observations whose weekly working gap is greater than
the 99th percentile and observations that are smaller than the 1st percentile. I also
drop all observations whose hourly wage is smaller than $2.00. All monetary units
are in real dollars where the base period is January 1994. Basic summary statistics
are presented in Table 2, the rst column presents means for observations surveyed
in months other than a World Cup month and the second column presents means
for observations surveyed in months during the World Cup. The top panel presents
means for all observations in the sample, and the bottom panel presents observations
for workers who are salary paid. When analyzing the complete sample there are two
important points to note in these raw estimates: rst, usual hours worked are 0.19
4The results are robust to selecting only males, and robust to the inclusion of the 1994 World Cup or not
7(12 minutes) hours greater when the World Cup is at play than during other months
while hours worked last week are shorter during World Cup months by 0.33 hours
(18 minutes) { this is most likely because the World Cup is played during summers.
Second, the proportion of employed workers who did not work last week is greater
during the World Cup months as well and this dierence is 1.4 percentage points.
If I restrict the sample exclusively to salary paid workers, usual hours of work are
indistinguishable between World Cup and non-World Cup surveys, but the dierence
in hours worked last week is almost an hour worked shorter during the World Cup
months. Importantly, the proportion of employed workers reporting zero hours last
week is almost twice as big during World Cup months than at other times.
To further explore these dierences among salary paid workers between World Cup
and non-World Cup summers, Table 3 presents the reason why last week hours are
less than usual hours on each row, and the proportion workers whose last week hours
are less than their usual workweek in the rst two columns and the weekly working
gap in the last two columns. Notice that this the sample in this table is restricted
to salary paid workers surveyed exclusively in June or July. The results in this table
suggest the following: rst, although the same proportion of workers take time o due
to holidays or vacations during summers with a World Cup and summers without, the
working hours gap is greater during summers when the World Cup is played. Second,
a greater proportion of workers reported less hours last week than in the usual week
during World Cup summers due to either illness or slack labor. This result is similar
to Skogman-Thoursie's (2002) who shows that workers in Sweden are more likely to
report sick on the Monday after the Calgary Winter Olympic Games and the skiing
cross country championships.
83 The FIFA World Cup
Recently, economists have paid some attention to the World Cup. For example,
Dohmen et al (2006) use an opinion survey in Germany to argue that when the
performance of the German national team improved in the 2006 World Cup, the eco-
nomic sentiments and expectations of Germans improved, and each win is associated
with even more positive sentiments and expectations. Similarly Edmans et al (2007),
use a cross-section of countries to show that when a country's national team loses in
the World Cup, the country's stock market will observe on average a loss of 64 basis
points in the following trading day. Hagn and Maennig (2008) use the World Cup
as a natural experiment to compare employment in German cities who hosted the
1974 World Cup, and those cities who don't, and they fail to nd any evidence of
employment eects due to hosting the World Cup. Finally and closer to this paper,
Tucker (2008) uses the 2002 World Cup as an exogenous instrument to analyze the
benets of the introduction of a communication technology in a nancial institution.
The FIFA Soccer World Cup is played every 4 years. All countries that are mem-
bers of FIFA must qualify in regional tournaments to play in the nal round where
games are played in the host country over the span of a month. Until the 1998 World
Cup the nal round consisted of 24 teams, and since then the number of teams play-
ing in the nal round has increased to 32. For example the 2006 nals were played by
5 African teams, 4 Asian teams (including the Middle East), 1 team from Oceania, 4
teams from Central America, North America or the Caribbean, 4 teams from South
America and 14 teams from Europe. These 32 teams are divided into 8 groups of
4. The top two teams in each group (16 total) qualify to the second round, where
9the tournament takes a format of direct elimination. The second round is followed
by the quarternals (third round) which consist of every winner of the second round
(8 in total). The winners from each quarternal play in the seminals, and nally
the grand nal and third place match that are played a month after the tournament
started.
Table 1 presents information on local times and dates in which games were played
for each of the four World Cups covered by the sample. Importantly, note that even
within World Cup years there is variation in the calendar dates that the World Cup is
played, and hence the CPS will observe dierent stages of the World Cup in dierent
years. In particular, USA 1994 was played from June 17 to July 17, and two CPS
surveys capture World Cup games in these days. The June survey, whose reference
week refers to the days 12-18, includes the inauguration and rst round games and
the July survey includes the seminals, the third place game and the grand nal.
France 1998 was played from June 12 to July 10 and also includes observations on
the June survey when the rst round was played (reference week June 7 to June 13)
and the July survey as the tournaments nal took place on Sunday of the reference
week (July 12 to July 18). In contrast, Korea-Japan was played from May 31 to June
30, and the June surveys reference week includes 23 rst round games. Germany
2006 was played between June 9 and July 9, and the June survey includes rst round
games from the week of June 11-June 17 plus the nal match which was played on
Sunday of the July surveys reference week.
It is worth noting that during the time span this paper covers soccer has gained in
popularity in the United States. The New York Times (2006) reports that the World
Cup nal match in 2006 reached 16.9 million viewers, and 11.9 of them saw it on
10ABC while 5 million did on Spanish speaking Univision. This is a 152% increment
from the 2002 World Cup and 31% increment from 1998. Also, viewership for the
2006 nal match was higher than that year's NBA nals and almost on par with
the NCAA tournament. But not only the nal match saw increased viewership: the
average viewership for ABC, ESPN and ESPN2 was 1.7 million, 2.3 million and 1.1
million respectively. For the 2006 World Cup 17 out of 20 ESPN's match telecasts
reached a rating of 1.0 or better, and 7 reached 2.0 or better. In the 1998 World Cup
only 7 match telecasts reached a rating of 1.0 and only 1 reached a rating of 2.0 or
better.
The identication strategy on this paper assumes that FIFA's decision of where
and when the World Cup is played is independent from the U.S. labor market. If
the choice of host country is done to maximize television viewership in the U.S then
using variation in the time at which games are televised in the U.S. fails to identify
workers' decision between market hours and time spent watching the World Cup5. If
such is the case, then it is conceivable that the World Cup games are scheduled at
times that maximize viewership, and in the absence of those games American workers
will consume other types of leisure anyway, and observed decreases of hours of work
during the World Cup will be spurious. This seems unlikely: First, the World Cups
host country is chosen 7 years in advance of each tournament by FIFAs executive
committee. The host country is chosen by a single transferable vote system, and
each candidate country must fulll the requisite of not belonging to the regional
federation that hosted any of the previous two World Cups . But even if the decision
by FIFAs executive committee is made by forecasting the best time to maximize U.S.
5This may be true for the 1994 U.S. World Cup, and the results in this paper are consistent with adding 1994 to
the sample or not
11viewership, variation across dierent local time zones across dierent World Cups will
identify the eect of the World Cup on hours of work as the World Cup will overlap
with the workday in some parts of the U.S. and not in other parts. Further, given the
length of one month that the World Cup lasts, I am assured that the CPS monthly
survey will contain observations which were surveyed during a World Cup every four
years.
4 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy in this paper consists of comparing the dierence between
hours of work last week and usual hours of work - heuristically this is similar to a
matched pairs estimation where we observe for the same observations hours during
the World Cup (hours last week) and hours at other times (usual hours of work).
Specically I estimate the following equation
Giyt = WCiyt + x
0
iyt + iyt (1)
where Giyt represents the gap between last week and usual hours, WCiyt is an
indicator variable that takes a value of one during a World Cup month, and zero
otherwise; x0
iyt is a vector of demographic characteristics that may or may not vary
with time (age, age squared, education, state, year dummies and occupation xed
eects). The subscript i represents each worker, y represents each year and t rep-
resents each month. The parameter of interest is  which represents the change in
hours of work during the World Cup,  < 0 means that hours last week are shorter
than usual hours in the main job. Equation 1 will estimate  consistently as long as
12cov(WCiyt;iyt) = 0 which is an implausible assumption. As suggested in Figure 1
it is quite possible that hours of work are lower during the World Cup because this
event takes place during the summer, and hours of work decrease during summers
anyway even in the absence of the World Cup. Alternatively it may be that hours of
work are shorter during the World Cup because of some idiosyncratic macroeconomic
phenomenon during 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006   a time variant characteristic. To
control for this I decompose iyt = t+y+iyt where y is a year specic component,
t is a month specic component and iyt is a random variable assumed to have mean
zero and iid across observations. Estimating equation 1 with year and month xed
eects estimates  consistently as long as dierences in hours of work within each
period of time are time invariant and cov(WCiyt;iyt) = 0 .
An alternative specication, that relaxes the time invariance assumption, is to take
advantage of the scheduled times the World Cup is played. As mentioned above, the
World Cup is played in a dierent country every four years, which generates variation
in the time high prole games are broadcast in the United States. For example,
during the USA 94 World Cup most games were played at 4:35 pm in the East Coast,
which is 1:35 pm in the Pacic Coast. In the other hand, during the Korea-Japan 02
World Cup games that were played at 8:30 pm Asian Standard Time, were televised
at 7:30 am on the United States' East Coast, and at 4:30 am in the Pacic Coast.
As argued in the previous section, the variation in the choice of host country and
therefore times games are televised in the United States is assumed to be exogenous
because FIFA's Executive Committee chooses the country where the World Cup will
be played arbitrarily. To take advantage of this variation I estimate the following
equation:
13Giyt = 1T1ijt + 2T2ijt + 3T3ijt + x
0
iyt + iyt (2)
where T1ijt equals one if most of the high prole games during the CPS survey
week were televised in region j between 12 am and 6 am and zero otherwise, T2ijt
takes a value of one if most of the high prole games during the CPS survey week
were televised in region j between 6 am and 12 pm, and T3ijt takes a value of one
if most of the high prole games during the CPS survey week were between 12 pm
and 6 pm in region j. Again, for this specication I use the time when most of the
high prole games were played during the reference week of the World Cup month
and the time is marked with a star in Table 1. Under this strategy, note that none of
the games were played between 6 pm and 12 am in the dierent U.S. local times, and
the omitted category in equation (2) is all observations surveyed in months when the
World Cup is not played.
A third specication is:
Giyt = 1M1jy + 2M2jy + 3M3jy + 4M4jy + +x
0
iyt + iyt (3)
where M1jy is the number of minutes World Cup games were broadcast live between
12 am and 6 am in region j's time zone during year y. Similarly M2jy is the number
of minutes games were broadcast live in region j between 6 am and 12 pm, M3jy is
the number of minutes games were broadcast live in region j live between 12 pm and
6 pm, and M4jy is the number of minutes games were broadcast live in region j. The
estimates of 1 4 are relative to changes in the hours of work during non-World Cup
periods conditional on the variables in vector x.
14Importantly, as it may be possible that workers show up in their workplace during
the World Cup, and they may take a break during the workday to follow the matches
but fail to report dierent hours of work in the data, my results are likely to estimate
a lower bound in these dierences of the change in hours of work during the World
Cup 6.
5 Results
Unconditional estimates of equations 1, 2 and 3 are presented in Table 4, the top panel
shows estimates from equation 1, the second panel shows estimates from equation 2,
and the bottom panel shows estimates from equation 3. The rst column presents
estimates for all workers, second column estimates for hourly paid workers and the
third column estimates for salary paid workers only. The rst row in each panel
represents the dierence between actual hours and usual hours in times when the
word is not in play. Across all specications, this number is robust at values of
62 weekly minutes worked less for hourly paid workers and 58 weekly minutes less
for salary paid workers. As in Figures I and II, it makes intuitive sense that these
dierences are negative as hours last week are likely zero sometimes because people
take vacations, sick leave, and temporary separations from the job and as long as
the separation is temporary and the job is still the respondents main job usual hours
will be non-zero. The second row in the top panel presents unconditional estimates
of  for equation 1, suggesting that all workers reduce work by 31 minutes per week
6While using television ratings for the World Cup is an attractive idea, I am unable to do this as weekly ratings by
region are not available from Nielsen Media (conversation with Ms. Carly Litzenberg, Client Service Executive, The
Nielsen Company) for the World Cups before 2002, thus using TV ratings will take away either the variation across
space if I use all four World Cups, or across time if I use the regional data.
15during the World Cup before any type of controls are added, hourly paid workers
reduce their paid work during the World Cup by 20 minutes per week, and salary
paid workers decrease their market hours by almost fty minutes per week.
The estimates for 1, 2 and 3 in equation 2 are presented in the middle panel
of Table 4. These estimates suggest that all American workers do not reduce their
hours of work when games are played between 12 am and 6 am, they do reduce their
hours by 28 minutes per week when games are played between 6 am and 12 pm,
and by 33 minutes per week when games are played between 12 pm and 6 pm. The
magnitude of the estimates for salary paid workers suggest that any dierences in
market labor during the World Cup are greatest among this group: between 6 am
and 12 pm salary paid workers reduce their weekly hours by 43 minutes, while hourly
paid workers reduce their weekly hours by 20 minutes. When games are between
12pm and 6 pm, salary paid workers reduce their weekly hours by 54 minutes, and
hourly paid workers only by 21 minutes. Finally, rows 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the bottom
panel show the estimates of 1, 2, 3 and 4 when the explanatory variable is the
number of minutes a World Cup game was being broadcast at dierent time zones.
Note that before controlling for other demographic characteristics, and concentrating
on the salary paid sample, each minute a game is being broadcast suggest reductions
of the hours gap by 0.05 minutes, 0.02 minutes and 0.26 minutes at 6am-12pm, 12pm-
6pm, and 6pm-12am respectively. The unusually high estimate for the 6pm-12am is
due to the U.S. World Cup in 1994, when the games were played on TV's primetime,
where not working due to vacation is more common. Again, the estimates in Table 4
are before any demographic controls are added, and due to the fact the World Cup
is played during summers, these estimates confound the eect that the World Cup
16has on the weekly work schedule and the eect that vacations have on the weekly
work schedules. Perhaps the one striking feature of this table is the dierence in the
World Cup coecient's estimates between hourly and salary pay, especially as the last
week usual hours estimate which capture the hourly gap in non-World Cup periods
is relatively close across the dierent pay groups. To compare estimates of changes
in the workweek due to the World Cup within each month and controlling for other
demographic characteristics, I turn to Tables 5, 6 and 7.
Table 5 presents ordinary least squares estimates for  when controls are added to
equation 1. The rst column presents estimates for all workers and includes controls
for education, age, age squared, state, month xed eects, and year xed eects. The
second column presents estimates for all workers and include occupation-year cross
product xed eects. The third and fourth columns present estimates for hourly paid
workers, with and without occupation-year xed eects respectively. The last two
columns replicate the same, but for salary paid workers. The estimates across these
specications suggest that even after controlling for month and year xed eects
American workers reduce their number of weekly hours of work during the World
Cup, and that this is mostly due to salary paid workers. For example, column 2
suggests that after controlling for observable characteristics all American workers
reduce their hours of work by an average of 9 weekly minutes during the World
Cup. When the sample is restricted to hourly paid workers the estimates are not
statistically dierent than zero. When the sample is restricted to salary paid workers
and include all controls, the change in hours of work during the World Cup is 28
minutes less. Again, these results highlight the importance of time-pay method on a
worker's schedule exibility, where salary paid workers exhibit more exibility than
17hourly paid.
Table 6 presents estimates for equation 2, again using occupation-year xed eects
in the even numbered columns. The results in column 2 suggest that after controlling
for demographic characteristics workers do not change their hours of work if the games
are between 12 am and 6 am, but if games are between 6 am and 12 pm workers supply
on average a little bit more than 15 minutes per week, and if games are between 12
pm and 6 pm workers supply on average 8 minutes less per week. None of these
estimates is statistically signicant dierent than zero at the 5% condence level, but
the last two are at the 10% condence level. Again, and as in Table 5, there are
stark contrasts between hourly and salary paid workers, as the bulk of the changes
in weekly hours of work are concentrated among the latter. That is, in column six,
where I restrict the sample to salary paid workers, I nd that when games are between
6 am and 12 pm the hours of work decrease by more than 32 weekly minutes, and
when games are between 12 pm and 6 pm the hours of work decrease by 28 weekly
minutes. These estimates do not seem out of line, and make intuitive sense, as they
suggest that one out of three salary paid American workers watch a World Cup game
every week when the World Cup overlaps with the work day.
Table 7 presents estimates of equation 3, and they indicate the change in weekly
minutes of work during the World Cup for each extra minute a game is played in each
time slot. The results suggest that after controlling for demographic characteristics
as well as year-occupation xed eects, weekly minutes of work among all workers
decrease by 2
100 for each extra minute when games are broadcast between 6 am and
12 pm. If the sample is restricted to salary paid workers then weekly minutes of work
during the World Cup decrease by 3
100 of a minute during 6 am and 12 pm. These
18estimates are not dierent to those in Table 5 above, if one considers that the average
World Cup week has approximately 10 games or 15 weekly hours in the 6 am to 12 pm
time slot, then 900 minutes 3
100 equals 27 weekly minutes on average. Unlike Table
6, the estimates for matches played between 12 pm and 6 pm are not statistically
signicant dierent than zero. This dierence is mostly due to the denitions of T1,
T2, and T3 where most of the games after 6 pm in the USA 94 World Cup fell in the
12 pm to 6 pm category, as 4:35 pm was the most common match time and hence T2
got a value of one. Also, the point estimates in this table for games played between
6 pm and 12 am are big in magnitude, but measured with high standard errors, yet
once month xed eects are added these estimates attenuate signicantly from those
in Table 4.
Table 8 estimates equation 1 for dierent subgroups (and their complements) of
salary paid workers and they include year-occupation xed eects: males, females,
immigrants, hispanics, college graduates, married workers and workers with 35 or
less years of age. If one concentrates on the point estimates, these estimates can
be compared with a baseline for all salary paid workers of -28 weekly minutes in
column 6 from Table 4. Not surprisingly males reduce their hours of work more than
females during the World Cup, immigrants tend to reduce their hours more than
native workers, and so do Hispanic workers. Surprisingly college graduates tend to
reduce their hours more than workers with less education, that is they reduce their
hours of work by more than 30 minutes (again, this is after all controls are added,
including month and year xed eects). Similarly, single or divorced workers reduce
their hours more than married workers . Finally, young salary paid workers reduce
their hours more than older workers do, by approximately more than 30 minutes.
19These dierences should be taken with caution and rather as supporting evidence of
the results in Tables 5, 6 and 7, as I am only comparing point estimates. Because
of the small samples that result from breaking up the sample it is hard to make any
inference across estimates based on the relatively high standard errors.
Finally, it is not clear whether wages should be included in equations 1 and 2,
as wages may determine changes in the hours of work during the World Cup, and
preferences for leisure may determine jointly the number of hours of work and wages
for a given worker. Furthermore, when using CPS data wages are calculated by
dividing usual weekly earnings over usual weekly hours of work, and the denominator
of the explanatory variable will also be part of the response variable if wages are
added to equation 1. Nevertheless, and assuming that I can identify the role that
wages have on the gap between hours last week and usual hours, I estimate equation 1
to include up to a quartic term in log wages, plus interactions between the World Cup
variables and log wages up to a quartic term 7. The results are presented in Figure
III which shows the estimated gap for equation 1 for salary and hourly paid workers
and as in Table 4, again and as in Table 4 the bulk of the dierences are concentrated
among salary paid workers. Importantly, as we move across the distribution of wages
from lowest earners to highest earners the dierence in the weekly hours gap between
observations surveyed during the World Cup and all other observations attenuates.
That is salary paid American workers at the bottom of the distribution work on
average one hour less during the World Cup, and this dierence attenuates to thirty
minutes for salary workers in the second quantile, and it continues diminishing as
7As usual hours enters in the left side of the equation with a negative sign and in the denominator on the right
side of the equation, my intuition is that a higher hourly wage due to relatively low usual hours will bias the estimate
of  towards zero as higher earnings will be associated with longer last week worked hours
20we move to the right of the distribution. This result is consistent with Aguiar and
Hurst (2008) who show that low earners are more likeley to consume leisure than high
earners. Importantly, and dierent to Aguiar and Hurst's nding, the relationship is
concave and dierences between usual and last week hours increase as we move from
the fourth quartile to the highest earners. 8.
6 Discussion
In this section I do dierent robustness checks to test whether the relationship that
the coecients discussed above are spurious, and they may be capturing some other
event or phenomena that is unobserved in the data. The rst exercise I do consists
on extending equation 1 to add a dummy variable for the months before and after
each World Cup. Specically, I estimate the following equation for salaried workers
exclusively:
Giyt = BBiyt + WCWCiyt + AAiyt + x
0
iyt + iyt (4)
where Biyt represents a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the observation was
surveyed in the month before the World Cup started, and Aiyt represents a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if the observation was surveyed in the month after the
World Cup. If my results above are capturing some unobserved phenomenon then
it may be that B 6= 0, WC 6= 0 and A 6= 0. Note that if salaried workers have a
contract with their employers that species a xed number of hours of work in a set
period of time, as suggested by the results in Conolly (2008), then it is possible that
8A similar exercise for equation 2 estimates a similar relationship, but the estimated dierences between World
Cup and other periods in the 6 am to 12 pm time slot, and the 12 pm to 6 pm time slot are only statistically signicant
dierent from zero at the 10% condence level.
21due to the World Cup B > 0, A > 0, or B + A > 0. If this is the case, then it
must be that reductions of hours of work during the World Cup will be accompanied
by increases in hours of work in the periods before or after the World Cup. This last
point is dicult to prove, as inter-temporal substitution of hours of work is more likely
within a week or even within a month, and not across months. Estimates for equation
(4) are presented in the top panel of Table 9, the rst column presents unconditional
estimates and the second columns includes estimates when all demographic controls
are added. Importantly, the estimates of B and A are zero, while the estimate of
wc is similar to the estimate of  in Table 4. Similarly, I estimate whether changes
in labor supply during the World Cup are compensated with changes in the hours of
work in the months after and before the World Cup across dierent times when the







k BTkiyt + 
WC
k WCTkiyt + 
A
k ATkiyt) + x
0
iyt + iyt (5)
The interpretation of equation (6) is analogous to equation (2) and BT1iyt takes a
value of one if the observation was surveyed during the month before a World Cup,
in a time zone where most of the matches were played between 12 am and 6 am
local time; WCT1iyt takes a value of one if the observation was surveyed during the
month when the World Cup was played, in a time zone where most of the games were
between 12 am and 6 am local time; AT1iyt takes a value of one if the observation
was surveyed during the month after a World Cup, in a time zone where most of the
matches were played between 12 am and 6 am local time. Similarly BT2iyt, WCT2iyt
, AT2iyt are dened for World Cups when games are played between 6 am and 12 pm
22local time, and BT3iyt, WCT3iyt , AT3iyt are dened for World Cup when games are
played 12 pm and 6 pm. The estimates are presented in the bottom panel of Table 9.
Again, the estimates for months before and after the World Cup are zero once that
demographic controls are added. These results suggest that whatever is driving the
reduction in hours of work during the World Cup is absent in the months before or
after the World Cup is played.
Another robustness check to test whether the results in this paper are spurious is
to test whether randomly chosen month year combinations can replicate the results
above. To do this I randomly choose 4 pairs on month year combinations    recall
there are four World Cups periods in the sample    and I generate the indicator
variable NWC    Not World Cup    which takes a value of one if the observation is
surveyed in a chosen year month combination. I then estimate the following equation
analogous to equation 1:
Giyt =  NWCiyt + x
0
iyt + iyt (6)
and I replicate this exercise ve hundred times. That is, I randomly generate 500
placebo World Cup experiments where the month and the year are randomly selected.
Figure IV presents the histogram of the 500 dierent coecients   estimated in this
exercise. Note hat the average mean of these coecients is zero, further note that
only 19% of these coecients are statistically signicant smaller than zero (one sided
test), that only 5% of these coecients fall to the left of the upper bound of the 95%
condence interval of the estimate of  in equation 1, and that less than 2% of these
coecients have a baseline estimate of magnitude as big (in absolute value) as that
23of the estimate of  in equation 19.
It is possible that the dierence between the estimates of the coecients in Figure
IV and the estimates in Table 4 are due to the fact that the World Cup is played
during summers (although in equations 1, 2 and 3 I control for month xed eects and
this should take care of it). To test this hypothesis, I replicate the above exercise but
I constrained the survey month to be either June or July, and randomly choose four
years (dierent than the World Cup years), in such a way that the new NWC vari-
able is composed of observations from four dierent June/July year combinations.
Again, I estimate equation 6 two hundred times and the histogram of estimates is
presented in Figure V. The average mean of these estimates is 2.14 minutes (not sta-
tistically signicant dierent than zero) more during the placebo June/July World
Cup observations , than at other times. Only six of these estimates are statistically
signicant smaller than zero. None of these placebo estimates reaches the upper limit
of the baseline estimate 95% condence interval. This result is intuitive as what I am
doing is comparing June/July from the World Cup, with all other June/July, and is
suggestive that whatever is driving the results for July 1994, June 1998, June-July
2002 and June 2006 is dierent than all other summers.
7 Summary
In today's labor market, workers benet from having some exibility in their work
schedules, and the ability to periodically supply dierent hours of work at any given
week than during the usual week will result in higher utility for the worker. In this
9Interestingly, 6 of the 9 estimates with a coecient of magnitude -28 or smaller include the survey week of January,
1996 when the Atlantic Coast lived one of the worst blizzards ever recorded. While in January 1995 0.4% of salaried
paid workers reported an absence for work due to weather and 2.0% did in January 1997, 12.0% did in January 1996.
24paper I use the natural variation that arises from the FIFA World Cup to explore the
exibility of the schedule of hours of work of American workers. The FIFA soccer
World Cup presents a good natural experiment to test workers' schedule exibility
and take advantage of three exogenous sources of variation: the place where the
World Cup is played which determines that the games will be televised in the United
States at dierent hours during the day, dierences in the times games are broadcast
in dierent time zones, and the fact that the World Cup is played every four years
which allows for inter-annual comparisons. I hypothesize that American workers are
likely to reduce their hours of work when the timing of the games' live broadcast in
the U.S. overlap with their market labor.
My results suggest that, after controlling for demographic characteristics, year and
month xed eects, American workers supply nine minutes of work less during the
World Cup, a result that indicates that 1 in 10 American workers watch a weekly
game. My results also show that the magnitude of these estimates is greater among
salary paid workers, who reduce their hours of work on average by half an hour per
week, this indicates that roughly 1 in 3 of all salary paid workers watch a World Cup
game per week. Importantly, I show that my estimates for males, immigrants and
highly educated workers are greater than for their complement demographic groups.
Further, my results do not present any evidence that reductions of hours of work dur-
ing the World Cup are accompanied with changes in the number of hours of work in
the month before or after the World Cup, or that the results are driven by factors that
are unobserved in the data. These results highlight the importance of pay frequency
in a worker's schedule exibility, as salaried paid workers have more discretion over
the number of hours they work, highlighting an important dierence between workers
25with dierent pay methods in the labor market.
References
[1] Aguiar, M., and Hurst, E. "Measuring leisure: The allocation of time over
ve decades". Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 3 (2007), 969{1006.
[2] Alex Edmans, D. G., and Norli, O. "Sports sentiment and stock returns".
Journal of Finance 62, 3 (2007), 1967{1998.
[3] Borjas, G. J. "The relationship between wages and weekly hours of work: The
role of division bias". Journal of Human Resources 15, 3 (1980), 409{423.
[4] Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Workers on exible and shift schedules in
May 2004, USDL 05-1198", 2005. Mimeo.
[5] Coleman, M. T., and Pencavel, J. "Changes in work hours of male employ-
ees, 1940-1988". Industrial and Labor Relations Review 46, 2 (1993), 262{283.
[6] Coleman, M. T., and Pencavel, J. "Trends in market work behavior of
women since 1940". Industrial and Labor Relations Review 46, 3 (1993), 653{
676.
[7] Conolly, M. "Here comes the rain again: Weather and the intertemporal
substitution of leisure". Journal of Labor Economics 26, 1 (2008), 73{100.
[8] Costa, D. "The wage and the length of the work day: From the 1890s to 1991".
Journal of Labor Economics 18, 1 (2000), 156{181.
26[9] Daniel C. Hamermesh, C. K. M., and Pocock, M. L. "Cues for timing and
coordination: Latitude, letterman and longitude". Journal of Labor Economics
26, 2 (2008), 223{246.
[10] Gonzalez-Chepela, J. "On the price of recreation goods as a determinant of
male labor supply". Journal of Labor Economics 25, 4 (2007), 795{824.
[11] Hagn, F., and Maning, W. "Employment eects of the Football World Cup
1974 in Germany". Labour Economics 15, 5 (2008), 1062{1075.
[12] Hamermesh, D. C. "12 million salary workers missing". Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 55, 4 (2002), 549{566.
[13] Kuhn, P. J., and Lozano, F. A. "The expanding workweek? understand-
ing trends in long work hours among US men 1979-2006". Journal of Labor
Economics 26, 2 (2008), 311{344.
[14] Sandomil, R. "Cup ratings are up, but fans deserve better". New Y ork Times
(July 11, 2006).
[15] Skogman-Thoursie, P. "Reporting sick: Are sporting events contagious".
Journal of Applied Econometrics 19, 3 (2004), 809{923.
[16] Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, D. H., and Sunde, U. "Seemingly irrele-
vant events aect economic perceptions and expectations: the FIFA World Cup
2006 as a natural experiment". IZA Working paper 2275 (2006).
[17] Tucker, C. "Identifying formal and informal inuence in technology adoption























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 1: Minutes Played in Each Time Zone During CPS Survey Week
All World Cups
Time EST CST MST PST
12 am - 6 am 1260 1260 1530 1830
6 am - 12 pm 1435 1945 1705 2190
12 pm - 6 pm 2705 2270 2420 1380
6 pm - 12 am 270 195 15 270
United States 1994: June 17 to July 17
12 am - 6 am 0 0 0 0
6 am - 12 pm 25 145 175 180
12 pm - 6 pm 695* 650* 800* 810*
6 pm - 12 am 270 195 15 0
France 1998: June 12 to July 10
12 am - 6 am 0 0 0 30
6 am - 12 pm 180 360 360 330
12 pm - 6 pm 540* 360* 360* 360*
6 pm - 12 am 0 0 0 0
Korea-Japan 2002: May 31 to June 30
12 am - 6 am 1260 1260 1530* 1800*
6 am - 12 pm 810* 810* 540 0
12 pm - 6 pm 0 0 0 0
6 pm - 12 am 0 0 0 270
Germany 2006: June 9 to July 9
12 am - 6 am 0 0 0 0
6 am - 12 pm 420 630 630 1680*
12 pm - 6 pm 1470* 1260* 1260* 210
6 pm - 12 am 0 0 0 270
Source: FIFA.com
33Table 2: Summary Statistics: Weekly Hours of Work
(1) (2)
Not World Cup World Cup
Usual hours 39.031 39.223
(0.007) (0.045)
Hours last week 38.020 37.688
(0.010) (0.063)
Not working | employed 0.028 0.042
(0.000) (0.001)
Proportion salary paid 0.368 0.364
(0.000) (0.002)
N 1,821,466 46,309
Conditional on being salary paid
Usual hours 42.869 42.863
(0.011) (0.072)
Hours last week 41.901 41.047
(0.015) (0.105)
Not working | employed 0.021 0.039
(0.000) (0.001)
N 663,396 16,671
Sample: All workers in the 1994-2007 CPS ORG
Standard errors in parentheses.
34Table 3: Dierences in Weekly Hours of Work
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion working less Change in minutes j working less
Not World Cup World Cup Not World Cup World Cup
Vacation-holiday 0.066 0.066 -24.449 -25.806*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.166) (0.411)
Childcare problems 0.007 0.007 -22.583 -22.158
(0.000) (0.001) (0.535) (1.267)
Illness 0.012 0.016* -20.703 -22.730
(0.000) (0.001) (0.391) (0.861)
Slack work-labor disputes 0.003 0.004* -15.466 -17.439
(0.000) (0.001) (0.603) (1.225)
Bad weather 0.001 0.000 -16.952 -11.317
(0.000) (0.000) (1.491) (2.244)
Other 0.005 0.006 -22.314 -23.024
(0.000) (0.001) (0.633) (1.507)
N 96,740 16,671
Sample: All salary paid workers surveyed in June or July in the 1994-2007 CPS ORG. * Denotes
World Cup estimate is statistically signicant dierent from the non World Cup estimate at 95%
condence level. Standard errors in parentheses.
35Table 4: OLS Minutes of Work on World Cup Unconditional Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
All workers Hourly paid Salary paid
(a) World Cup indicator variable
Last week | Usual hours -60.644* -62.139* -58.074*
(0.459) (0.583) (0.695)
During World Cup -31.437* -20.274* -50.892*
(3.398) (4.101) (5.194)
N 1,867,775 1,187,708 680,067
(b) Most common time of game indicator variable
Last week | Usual hours -60.644* -62.139* -58.074*
(0.459) (0.583) (0.695)
World Cup match 0 | 6 -16.490 -9.735 -28.193
(11.279) (14.656) (19.923)
World Cup match 6 | 12 -28.792* -20.156* -43.258*
(7.614) (9.877) (10.481)
World Cup match 12 | 18 -33.223* -21.049* -54.698*
(3.988) (4.703) (6.238)
N 1,867,775 1,187,708 680,067
(c) Minutes played at each time variable
Last week | Usual hours -60.704* -62.161* -58.202*
(0.460) (0.583) (0.695)
Minutes 0| 6 0.006 0.008 0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Minutes 6| 12 -0.034* -0.027* -0.046*
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Minutes 12| 18 -0.006 0.002 -0.020*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Minutes 18| 24 -0.217* -0.194* -0.259*
(0.034) (0.041) (0.055)
N 1,867,775 1,187,708 680,067
* Denotes statistically signicant dierent to zero at 5% condence level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at PSU level.
Sample: All workers in the 1994-2007 CPS ORG.
36Table 5: OLS Minutes of Work on World Cup Conditional Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All workers Hourly paid Salary paid
World Cup Indicator -8.982* -8.973* 2.207 1.968 -28.388* -28.115*
(3.732) (3.734) (4.566) (4.570) (5.793) (5.782)
Occ-Year Fixed Eects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant -16.392* -4.914 -18.930* -8.015 -16.375 0.816
(6.159) (5.998) (7.456) (7.214) (11.877) (11.707)
R
2 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.010
N 1,867,775 1,867,775 1,187,708 1,187,708 680,067 680,067
* Denotes statistically signicant dierent than zero at 5% condence level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at PSU level.
Sample: All workers in the 1994-2007 CPS ORG.
Other regressors included are month xed eects, year xed eects, state xed eects, years of education, age, age
squared hispanic, black, immigrant, marital status and female indicator.
37Table 6: OLS Minutes of Work on World Cup by Hour of Match
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All workers Hourly paid Salary paid
World Cup match 0 | 6 -4.324 -1.829 3.014 6.178 -16.550 -14.269
(11.491) (11.600) (14.848) (14.898) (20.405) (20.583)
World Cup match 6 | 12 -17.668* -15.471 -8.168 -5.660 -33.580* -32.138*
(7.805) (8.037) (10.115) (10.248) (10.781) (11.120)
World Cup match 12 | 18 -11.036* -7.774 0.925 3.614 -32.118* -27.973*
(4.086) (4.196) (4.910) (5.074) (6.499) (6.658)
Occ-Year Fixed Eects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant -6.770 -4.906 -10.230 -8.017 -5.081 0.859
(5.839) (5.998) (7.045) (7.215) (11.550) (11.707)
R
2 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.010
N 1,867,775 1,867,775 1,187,708 1,187,708 680,067 680,067
* Denotes statistically signicant at 5% condence level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at PSU level.
Sample: All workers in the 1994-2007 CPS ORG.
Other regressors included are month xed eects, year xed eects, state xed eects, years of education, age, age
squared hispanic, black, immigrant, marital status and female indicator.
38Table 7: OLS Hours of Work on World Cup by Minutes Played in Survey Week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All workers Hourly paid Salary paid
World Cup match 0 | 6 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
World Cup match 6 | 12 -0.023* -0.022* -0.017 -0.015 -0.035* -0.033*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
World Cup match 12 | 18 0.004 0.005 0.012 0.013 -0.010 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
World Cup match 18 | 24 -0.079* -0.050 -0.064 -0.037 -0.109* -0.073
(0.035) (0.036) (0.042) (0.043) (0.056) (0.057)
Occ-Year Fixed Eects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant -6.835 -4.968 -10.315 -8.081 -5.080 0.838
(5.838) (5.998) (7.045) (7.213) (11.550) (11.708)
R
2 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.010
N 1,867,775 1,867,775 1,187,708 1,187,708 680,067 680,067
* Denotes statistically signicant dierent than zero at 5% condence level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at PSU level.
Sample: All workers in the 1994-2007 CPS ORG.
Other regressors included are month xed eects, year xed eects, state xed eects, years of education, age, age








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 9: OLS Hours of Work on World Cup, Before and After
(1) (2)
(a) World Cup indicator variable
Month before World Cup 14.305* 5.397
(4.126) (4.830)
During World Cup -51.736* -26.140*
(5.201) (5.911)
Month after World Cup -50.442* 8.108
(5.293) (5.950)
Controls No Yes





(a) Most common time of game indicator
Month before WC match 0 | 6 5.739 -10.245
(16.197) (17.142)
World Cup match 0 | 6 -29.037 -14.023
(19.924) (20.652)
Month after WC match 0 | 6 -69.463* -12.885
(20.131) (20.701)
Month before WC match 6 | 12 17.428* -1.830
(7.847) (8.721)
World Cup match 6 | 12 -44.101* -31.737*
(10.481) (11.224)
Month after WC match 6 | 12 -50.822* 3.923
(11.073) (11.939)
Month before WC match 12 | 18 13.993* 8.330
(4.919) (5.528)
World Cup match 12 | 18 -55.542* -25.263*
(6.245) (6.802)
Month after WC match 12 | 18 -49.038* 10.673
(6.297) (6.792)
Controls No Yes





* Denotes statistically signicant dierent than zero at 5% condence level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at PSU level.
Sample: All salary paid workers in the 1994-2007 CPS ORG.
Other regressors included are month xed eects, year xed eects, state xed eects, years of education, age, age
squared hispanic, black, immigrant, marital status and female indicator.
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